Challenge

The Port of Belgrade’s property and investor rights were being violated by arbitrary Serbian legislation. There were limited domestic channels for these rights to be rectified and the Port of Belgrade was about to lose significant holdings. It turned to Alber & Geiger for help.

Strategy

The strategy made use of the new supra-national extraterritoriality, which post-communist states have been using to reconstitute certain rights and obligations. It addressed the EU institutions and Member States while Serbia was in the process of fulfilling its obligation to attain EU candidate status. It put forward comprehensive legal analysis that employed the entirety of the acquis communautaire, helping the legal narrative of the Serbian government and that of the Commission come together in a coherent mutually beneficial form.

Results

Alber & Geiger’s lobbing activity raised the awareness of European Parliament and the Commission towards the rights violations. We persuaded the European Commission to pressure the Serbian government into changing the content of these laws and to bring them in line with the EU acquis communautaire.

Challenge

Alber & Geiger represented Panama in the aftermath of the “Panama papers” with regard to the new EU anti money laundering blacklist. As a result of the “Panama papers” the EU decided for the first time to set up its own blacklist. Before that, the EU would copy the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) lists.

In Summer 2019, Panama was added to the grey list of FATF, at a time when the country was finalizing its reforms. Alber & Geiger was called to halt the result in FATF from spilling over in the EU and to weigh in the new EU methodology and the procedural gaps in the EU listing. Panama was caught in a timing paradox: Its automatic EU listing would be followed by a potential delisting from FATF, without clear assurances that the latter would be reflected in an EU delisting.

Strategy

Our goal was straightforward: raise awareness for Panama’s advances in combating money laundering and through that ensure that the EU will not unjustly list Panama as a high risk third country. Our message had to circle in the three key EU institutions. The architect of the procedure and list of high risk third countries, the European Commission, and the gatekeepers of the procedure, the European Parliament and the Member States.

Our message was tailor made for each front, appealing the several working levels and directorates of the Commission, the Committees of the European Parliament and different levels of organization in the Member States. Alber & Geiger grasped the opportunity of the drafting of the new methodology for the EU listing of high risk third countries, to engage with the different Commission directorates involved in the process and apply Panama’s position. In the Parliament, we focused on rewarding a third country such as Panama, which is determined to turn a bad precedent into a success story and we stressed upon the bilateral relationships of Panama towards the Member States.

Results

The EU did not implement its list and methodology as planned. Panama being listed by the EU as a high risk third country within the EU anti money laundering framework now is based on an automatic listing/delisting process with FATF. Our lobbying efforts enhanced the visibility and acknowledgement of Panama’s efforts in modernizing its anti-money laundering regime and changed the original EU methodology draft according to the demands of Panama.

Challenge

We were hired by the Council for a Democratic Iran (CDI) to raise political awareness and build support for the CDI before the EU. The hurdle here was to promote the very specific foreign policy position of the CDI, with the Member States governments, with conflicting positions on Iran. The subtle CDI policy locus fell in between confrontation and accommodation. This had to be done in a universal, politically neutral manner.

Strategy

The strategy relied on a data collection and dissemination process based on our distinct EU lobbying infrastructure. We gathered a detailed pool of information from a holistic range of institutional, local, NGO and inter-governmental sources.

Subsequently our team translated the data to be compatible with the policy structures of the EU institutions. We tailored the message to different audience catchments of Member States. Overall the strategy outlined an accurate overview of the scale of repression and human rights violations in Iran. Concurrently it promoted positive transnational tools to tangibly shape policy accordingly.

Results

CDI’s message was successfully transplanted into the divergent attitudes of the EU Member States and EU institutions. We helped CDI contribute to greater coherence in the perception of Iranian politics and policies. Ultimately we prevented the subtleties of diplomacy from concealing the human rights violations in Iran. This created a context for more constructive and bold communications from media outlets and government officials with respect to the repressive actions.